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For the past few years, and in several publica-
tions,1 Hilary Putnam has espoused an empirical brand 
of realism, internal realism,* which he believes to be 
the proper replacement for metaphysical realism. 
Putnam takes the latter view minimally to be (1) that 
there is a world which is independent of any particular 
model or representation which we, as theorists, might 
have of it, and (2) that there must be a determinant 
reference relationship between the terms in the meta-
physical realist's language and pieces of the world1 
(RR, p. 125). The internal realist, on the other hand, 
regards all of the characteristics of the world as be-
ing theory-relative and that we can have no intelligi-
ble notion of how the world really is. How the world 
is to us is dependent upon a theory or representation 
which we have of it, and statements of the theory which 
assert reference relationships between terms of the 
theory and their referents are tautologies with respect 
to the theory (RR, pp. 132, 136). 
I 
In defending the internalist position, Putnam em-
ploys two important lines of argument, both of which 
assault the metaphysical realist's notion of reference 
as a determinant relationship between the terms of his 
language and pieces of the world. One of Putnam's ar-
guments, which will be examined shortly, assumes the 
realist's acceptance of classical two-valued semantics 
and moves to what he believes are absurd consequences. 
His positive line of argument for the acceptance of the 
internalist position runs something like the following. 
Let the phrase 'state of affairs' neutrally name that 
situation which is to be modeled or represented. Now, 
given a state of affairs, there are a number of possi-
ble representations, models or theories of that state 
of affairs which depend upon the features or variables 
that one deems either as important or as extraneous. 
As a concrete example, consider the construction of 
theories designed to explain the behavior of electro-
magnetic radiation in the visible portion of the light 
spectrum. The selection of certain features yields the 
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model of light as a particle (which renders the pho-
toelectric effect explicable) while the selection of 
other features of the state of affairs results in the 
model of light as a wave (which explains the phenomena 
of refraction and diffusion). The metaphysical realist 
would assert that there is a way which the world is, 
specifically, a way which electromagnetic radiation is, 
and that the two models of light merely pick out par-
ticular features of the world. Putnam's move, however, 
begins with the observation that certain true sentences 
of one theory are false when embedded in another theory 
of equal correctness,* which, for Putnam, is evidence 
that such sentences express theory-relative properties. 
In our example, the sentence 'Electro-magnetic radia-
tion travels as photons, i.e., as concentrated bundles 
of energy with a mass', while true in the particle the-
ory of light, would be false in the wave characteriza-
tion, hence expressing the theory-relative property of 
being a photon. 
If one accepts Putnam's account of theory-relative 
properties of the world, it is only a short, fatal step 
to the realization that one's most cherished beliefs 
about the "real" properties of the world are incorrect: 
"The fact is, so many properties of THE WORLD—starting 
with just the categorical ones, such as cardinality, 
particulars, or universals, etc.—turn out to be 
'theory-relative' that THE WORLD ends up as a Kantian 
'noumenal' world, a mere 'thing in itself'. If one 
cannot say how THE WORLD is theory-independently, then 
talk' of all of these theories as descriptions of 'the 
world' is empty." (RR, p. 133). 
It is now easy to see how reference is treated in 
the internal realist's picture. If "being a particle" 
is a theory-dependent property of light, as opposed to 
being a property of a theory-independent bit of the 
world, then the statement ''photons' refers to photons' 
cannot assert the existence of a relationship between 
the term 'photons' and some independent bits of the 
world, namely, photons. For the internalist, there are 
photons only within the boundaries of the theory of 
light as a particle; and within that theory, it is a 
mere tautology that ''photons' refers to photons' be-
cause that's just how the term is used. 
II 
Although the foregoing line of argument provides 
some support for internal realism, I find Putnam's ar-
gument designed to show that the metaphysical realist's 
position is untenable to be far more controversial. 
For this reason, the remainder of this paper will be 
devoted to providing a clear statement of this argument 
and examining some of its defects. 
Putnam wishes to argue that the moderate realist 
position (that is, the metaphysical realist position) 
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which accepts both (i) classical notions of truth and 
reference, and (ii) naturalism with respect to powers 
of the mind, is untenable by virtue of certain model-
theoretic results derived in classical two-valued se-
mantics, most notably, the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem 
(and, in RR, the Godel Completeness Theorem).* The ar-
gument runs as follows: 
Suppose an individual X, such that X accepts 
(i) Classical two-valued semantics with all of its 
model-theoretic results including the classical 
notions of truth and reference. 
(ii) Naturalism with respect to our mental powers. 
(iii) The view that all significant theories admit of 
first-order formalization (This may be a bit of a 
generalization, but it will be a necessary one; 
actually, Putnam does mention as candidates for 
first-order formalization total science, belief 
systems—"all our beliefs"—and theories of lan-
guage use--"the total use of language") (MR, p. 
466). 
(iv) The brute fact that the intended interpretations 
of the terms in a theory are fixed. 
By virtue of (i), X accepts the Lowenheim-Skolem Theo-
rem, that is, that a satisfiable first-order theory in 
a countable language has a countable model. Moreover, 
X accepts by (i) the relativity of set-theoretic no-
tions as suggested by the Lowenheim-Skolem Paradox to 
the effect that the axioms of a formal system cannot 
capture intended interpretations;' specifically, given 
a significant theory T, the axioms of T cannot fix an 
intended interpretation, which is to say that satisfac-
tion of the theoretical constraints7 of T leaves inter-
pretations unfixed. Nor can operational constraints 
fix interpretations, for the downward Lowenheim-Skolem 
provides for a countable submodel of T, that is, a sub-
model such that the same sentences of T appear to be 
true. Hence, if by (iv) X accepts that interpretations 
are fixed, it must be by some other method than by the 
satisfaction of constraints on the theory T. 
Could X claim that interpretations are fixed by 
intentionality? No, for this would be in violation of 
(ii), the denial of any non-natural power of the mind. 
Could X instead claim that understanding in some way 
fixes interpretations? In order to do so, understand-
ing would have to be a natural process by (ii), which 
Putnam takes to be knowing the manner in which a lang-
uage is used. But, the total use of language (opera-
tional plus theoretical constraints) is itself a first 
orderable theory by (iii), and language use reduces to 
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the satisfaction of certain constraints on a theory, 
which, as was argued above, cannot fix an interpreta-
tion. Therefore, if X holds (i), (ii) and (iii) simul-
taneously, he must conclude that interpretations cannot 
be fixed. The addition of tenet (iv) yields the con-
tradiction that interpretations both are and are not 
fixed; hence, X cannot consistently hold tenets (i), 
(ii), (iii) and (iv). 
Putnam allows two choices at this juncture: one 
may either reject (ii) and opt for a magical grasp of 
concepts (which would constitute an appeal to something 
over and above theoretical constraints as exhaustive 
for understanding) or one may take Putnam's view, 
rejecting (i) and opting for internal realism wherein 
'truth' and 'reference' undergo a radical reinterpreta-
tion (MR, pp. 465-66). 
An alternate manner of viewing the problematic sit-
uation is to suppose that T is an ideal theory, meeting 
all of the operational and theoretical constraints 
which one would want in a theory (e.g., T is consist-
ent, elegant, simple plausible, a useful predictive 
device, etc.) but may still be false by (i). That is, 
if T is false, then the reference relationship between 
the language of T and the world may not be the intended 
relationship. But, if the interpretation meets all of 
the operational constraints, which means that all of 
the right sentences come out true, and if T meets all 
theoretical constraints as well, then the notion that T 
might be false, that the interpretation is not the in-
tended one, that reference might be anything more than 
the meeting of theoretical constraints, "appears to 
collapse into unintelligibility." (RR, pp. 125-26, MR, 
pp. 471-74). 
Ill 
In criticizing Putnam's argument that the metaphys-
ical realist who adopts (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) si-
multaneously is reduced to an absurd position, I would 
like to make three specific points: 
(1) Putnam contends that the metaphysical realist 
accepts classical two-valued semantics with all of its 
model-theoretic results; but there is one result which 
he seems to ignore which could be telling against his 
account, namely Godel's Incompleteness Theorem. 
(2) Putnam contends that the naturalistic minded 
realist believes that there are no mysterious powers of 
the mind (e.g., "intentionality" or a Platonic grasp of 
ideas) which he takes to mean that understanding a 
language reduces to the satisfaction of operational and 
theoretical constraints in the theory of total language 
use (MR, pp. 474-75). But, John R. Searle performs a 
thought experiment in "Minds, Brains, and Programs" 
which suggests that perhaps the naturalistic thesis, as 
Putnam recounts it, should be discarded or modified. 
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In short, there may be more compelling reasons for 
rejecting (ii) of the argument than rejecting (i) as 
Putnam opts. 
(3) Putnam contends that the metaphysical realist 
must admit that all significant theories, for example, 
total science, belief systems or theories of natural 
language be first-order formalizable in order to apply 
the Lowenheim-Skolem argument; but this is, at best, a 
dubious contention. 
(1) Putnam attempts to show that the metaphysical 
realist's position reduces to absurdity by proposing 
that he cannot both accept the results of classical 
two-valued semantics, specifically, the Lowenheim-
Skolem Theorem and the Godel Completeness Theorem, as 
well as a naturalistic theory of the use of language. 
However, it looks as though Putnam does not allow the 
metaphysical realist all of the results which model 
theory provides. 
Consider an ideal theory T, of the type provided 
for in (iii) above, that is, such that T is first-order 
formalizable, meets operational and theoretical con-
straints, and, at least in the case of a theory of nat-
ural language, is complex enough to be adequate for 
arithmetic (this will be the case, for the first-order 
formalization of arithmetic can be embedded in the the-
ory of language). 
Now, if T meets all of Putnam's theoretical con-
straints, then it will be both consistent and a useful 
predictive device. Being the latter, one would expect 
T to contain reliable generalizations, which is to say 
that one would not want T to be such that there is a 
predicate Px c T, where for all n in a class of indiv-
iduals under an interpretation, T I— P(n) and T !•— 
-(x)Px. For instance, the theory of light as a particle 
T, would not do well to have the predicate Px, where T 
h-Pa, Pb, . . ., Pn, and yet prove -(x)Px. Hence, our 
theory would not be omega-inconsistent, which is to say 
that not only must consistency be a theoretical con-
straint, but omega-consistency must be as well." 
Therefore, T will be: 
(i) first order formalizable 
(ii) omega-consistent 
(iii) adequate for arithmetic 
and, by Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, there will be 
truths (about total science, a belief system or a theo-
ry of the use of language) which will escape the for-
malization of T: for Godel showed that provability is 
a weaker notion than the classical notion of truth re-
gardless of the axiomatic system involved. 
How can these observations be a problem for Put-
nam's argument? Putnam holds that the metaphysical 
realist views all significant theories as being first-
order formalizable. This being the case, one of the 
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theoretical constraints to be satisfied by T is that 
all of the "right" formulas be derivable in the for-
malization, that is, we get all of the proofs that we 
want. Further, the derivations of T which we have in 
hand appear to be true; observational constraints are 
satisfied. But, for the metaphysical realist who ac-
cepts model-theoretic results, no formalization of the 
ideal theory T, will capture every truth regardless of 
the results obtained by formal manipulation of the lan-
guage and observational confirmation. Thus, for the 
realist it is simply not unintelligible that ideal 
theories, meeting all operational and theoretical con-
straints, might still be false, for he would resist the 
move to equate truth with the satisfaction of the lat-
ter if construed as producing the right derivations. 
Formal systems of the ilk required by Putnam will al-
ways be inadequate, that is, incomplete, by Godel's In-
completeness Theorem. 
Giving the point a Tarskian cast, the metatheory of 
language use, that is, the theory which speaks of the 
operational and theoretical constraints to be satisfied 
by a theory of language use, will be of the same order 
as the latter. This being the case, then the metaphys-
ical realist cannot accept that there is some kind of 
equivalence between truth and the satisfaction of theo-
ry constraints, for if the order of the metalanguage is 
at most equal to that of the language itself, then a 
definition of truth which is materially adequate cannot 
be constructed.' 
(2) In his essay, "Minds, Brains, and Programs,",0 
John R. Searle performs a thought experiment in order 
to voice his intuition that instruments which implement 
formal systems cannot be said to understand (or to have 
other cognitive states) by virtue of the formal pro-
gramming . 
Searle, who does not understand Chinese, imagines 
himself locked in a room and given a large batch of 
symbols. Further, Searle supposes that he is given a 
second batch of symbols together with rules written in 
English which he understands quite well. The English 
rules indicate how Searle is to correlate one set of 
formal symbols with another by virtue of their shapes 
alone. Finally, Searle imagines that he is given a 
third set of symbols with English instructions to the 
effect that he is to correlate the third batch with the 
first two batches and respond employing certain of the 
symbols. Mow, a Chinese speaker outside of the Searle-
in-the-box system would say that the first batch of 
symbols constituted a script written in Chinese, the 
second, a story, and the third batch was a series of 
questions to which Searle provided answers in Chinese 
employing the English formation rules. 
The point of this thought experiment is the follow-
ing: to an outside observer who was a speaker of Chi-
nese the Searle system (which consists of Searle locked 
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in a room with his English instructions for manipulat-
ing symbols) seems to understand Chinese; the system 
seems to read Chinese as well as to answer questions 
employing the language. However, Searle, the implemen-
ter of the formal programming, produces what would ap-
pear to be answers by manipulating formal symbols—he 
does not understand Chinese at all. That is, under-
standing is not captured by implementing a formal sys-
tem (Searle, pp. 284-85). 
I wish to adopt Searle's intuition and apply it to 
Putnam's contention that the metaphysical realist 
should accept (ii), that is, that there are no myste-
rious powers of the mind (which commits the realist to 
the view that understanding a language reduces to know-
ing how to use the language, that is, to the satisfac-
tion of the operational and theoretical constraints of 
a theory of total language use). 
Recall that Putnam has the realist assent to the 
formalization of the total use of language. We may al-
low, then, that Searle has received complete instruc-
tions in English (the metalanguage) for the manipula-
tion of the symbols of Chinese (the object language). 
No doubt, the operational and theoretical constraints 
of the theory of the total use of the Chinese language 
are all satisfied by the activity of the Searle-in-the-
box system; as a matter of fact, although Searle does 
not understand Chinese, the system's responses would 
fool an actual language user. But again, the symbol 
manipulator simply does not understand Chinese, even 
though the system uses it correctly; it seems that 
something more is needed for understanding, which is to 
say that contrary to Putnam's view, something more than 
the satisfaction of constraints is required for the 
fixing of intended interpretations.11 
One might object at this juncture that the question 
of whether or not Searle understands Chinese is ancil-
lary to the question of whether or not the Searle sys-
tem understands Chinese; after all, the system is meet-
ing the theoretical constraints of the theory of the 
use of Chinese, not Searle himself—the system fools 
the native speaker of Chinese. But, if we allowed that 
the formal programming plus the implementer of the pro-
gramming together could understand Chinese, I believe 
that this would commit us (as well as Putnam) to the 
view that understanding is a rarified kind of cognition 
which would not minimally capture what we would like 
understanding to be. Understanding is not in using a 
language correctly, something which the Searle system 
does but Searle does not, but in knowing how to use the 
language, something which neither Searle nor the system 
can do. Analogously, my chess computer (I blush to ad-
mit) consistently beats me on the tournament level--its 
actions meet all constraints of the theory of chess. 
But, I am consoled in knowing that although the com-
puter plays by the rules it doesn't know when it has 
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made a game winning move. So it seems that even if one 
attempts to talk about the system's understanding in-
stead of Searle's understanding, intuitions indicate 
that the system, although satisfying all language use 
theory constraints, just doesn't as the naturalistic 
realist would assert, understand. 
The point I wish to make is this. If I were a de-
vout realist who accepted the naturalistic thesis, the 
foregoing considerations adopted from Searle would move 
me more towards rejecting assumption (ii) in Putnam's 
argument than rejecting assumption (i). Doing so may 
render understanding mysterious, but classical two val-
ued semantics remains intact. 
(3) Recall that in setting up the argument, Putnam 
asserts that the metaphysical realist must make some 
assumptions about (i) semantics, and about (ii) non-
natural mental powers. Moreover, recall that after the 
realist's position was "reduced to absurdity," Putnam 
proposed that one might either drop assumption (ii) and 
become a non-naturalist with respect to understanding, 
or drop (i) and become a verificationist. However, he 
surreptitiously asserts that the metaphysical realist 
must accept (iii), that is, that there are first-order 
formalizations of total science, belief systems and to-
tal language use. If not, then the Skolemization move 
which requires consistent sets of first-order sentences 
cannot be pulled off. 
Suppose, then, that we explicitly state (iii) as an 
assumption made by the realist which is to bear equal 
weight with (i), (ii) and (iv). The result of this 
move is a third option which Putnam ignores (and which 
seems the most reasonable), namely, to drop (iii) in-
stead of dropping (i) or (ii); there seems to be no 
reason to believe that a total science, belief system 
or total use of language can be expressed solely in a 
first-order formalization. As an example illustrating 
this point, consider Richard Grandy's contribution from 
his Advanced Logic for Applications: 
It has been recently suggested that first order 
logic is inadequate to express certain statements 
of natural languages. For example, if there are 
four place "atomic" expressions of English 
F(x,y,z,w) then it might be the case that for ev-
ery value of x we can find a w such that 
F(x,y,z,w). If the choice of y depends only on x 
and the choice of w depends only on z, then 
neither (x) (Ey) (z) (Ew) Fxyzw nor (z) (Ew) (x) 
(Ey) Fxyzw fully captures the truth of the matter 
for the first of these is true even if the choice 
of a value of w depends on x and y as well as z. 
Similarly, the second is true even if the choice 
of y depends on z and w as well as x. 1 2 
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The move which is instrumental in winning assent 
for Putnam is the Skolemization of the entire theory, 
creating the possibility of unintended interpretations. 
Moreover, it was necessary that the metatheory, that 
is, the theory which speaks of the operational and the-
oretical constraints be first-orderizable as well: "In 
short, one can 'Skolemize' absolutely everything. It 
seems to be absolutely impossible to fix a determinant 
reference (without appeal to non-natural mental powers) 
for any term at all. If we apply the argument to the 
very metalanguage we use to talk about the predicament 
. . . ?" (MR, p. 476). 
But here's the rub. Apart from the problem of ob-
taining an adequate definition of truth in the meta-
theory, that very metatheory, which speaks of the oper-
ational and theoretical constraints to be met by the 
theory, quantifies over predicates,1' which is to say 
that the metalanguage, if formalizable at all, is more 
properly cast in a second-order formalization. But, if 
it is second-order formalizable, then one may employ 
the fact that there are formulas of second-order theo-
ries which are not satisfiable in finite or denumerably 
infinite domains,1* effectively short-circuiting the 
attempted move to Skolemize everything at the first 
step, for the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, as well as the 
Godel Completeness Theorem, have no second-order ana-
logues. l* 
If Putnam were to admit that some theories, most 
notably, the theory of the use of language, have only 
second-order formulations, then the metaphysical real-
ist has a last bastian against unintended interpreta-
tions a la Skolem; he has not found a manner in which 
reference is fixed which is over and above the satis-
faction of operational and theoretical constraints, but 
there is at least the possibility that something does. 
NOTES 
'Among these publications are the following: 
"Realism and Reason,11 Meaning and the Moral Sciences 
(Boston: Routedge and Kegan Paul, 1979), hereafter RR, 
"Models and Reality," The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 
Volume 45, Number 3, September 1980, hereafter MR, 
Reason, Truth and History (New York: Cambridge, 1981), 
hereafter RTH. 
'Although Putnam calls himself an internal realist, 
he's actually playing "fast and loose" with the term. 
If one accepts Michael Dummett's semantic characteriza-
tion of realism in his paper "Realism," Synthese 52 
(1982), hereafter R, and it seems that Putnam does in 
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part, then his position would be better characterized 
as a form of anti-realism, for Putnam, among other 
things, dispenses with the classical notion of ref-
erence as playing a crucial role in the semantic ac-
count of meaning. Internal realism, as will be seen, 
is actually a brand of verificationism. 
'This second assumption which Putnam requires the 
metaphysical realist accept moves realism from the 
realm of ontology to semantics. Dummett, making a sim-
ilar move (see note 2), construes realism as a semantic 
thesis for the dubious reason that "realism about the 
future or about ethics, do not seem readily classifia-
ble as doctrines about a realm of entities." (R, p. 
55). Regardless of the reason for the move, Dummett 
asserts that the realist must assume (i) that the 
statements of a given class are determined by reality 
as either true or false, and (ii) one must have a cer-
tain conception of how they are so determined, which, 
for the realist amounts to an acceptance of classical 
two-valued semantics, complete with its conception of 
reference (R, pp. 56-57). That the metaphysical real-
ist accepts classical two-valued semantics is vital for 
Putnam's argument against the position. 
Putnam further asserts that, as a consequence of 
(2), there is exactly one true and complete description 
of how the world is (RTH, p. 49), which, as Hartry 
Field points out, is not a doctrine which any metaphys-
ical' realist ought to hold; all that the realist is 
committed to is that given a particular language, L, 
"there is at most one true and complete description of 
the world" which employs the concepts represented in L, 
although such a description is not guaranteed because 
of the possibility of a natural "slippage" between the 
terms of L and their referents. (Hartry Field, 
"Realism and Relativism," The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 79, No. 10, October 1982, p. 554.) 
*Two theories will be equally correct on Putnam's 
view if they satisfy the same theoretical constraints, 
e.g., they are equally elegant, plausible, simple, use-
ful, etc. 
5Recall that Putnam, like Dummett, requires that 
the metaphysical realist accept classical two-valued 
semantics as a matter of course. Field takes issue 
with this assumption as far as it entails that truth 
involves a correspondence relation between signs and 
sets of things, suggesting that sophisticated variants 
of the redundancy theory of truth are held by some to 
capture all there is to say about truth. ("Realism and 
Relativism," p. 354.) 
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•Take your favorite axiomatic set theory with A, B, 
. . ., K as the closures of the axioms. By the 
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem there is a domain, D, such 
that A, B, . . ., K are simultaneously satisfied and O 
< ( D) ^ (N). Now consider the set R which is a set in 
axiomatic set theory, is the set of all subsets of N, 
and by Cantor's Theorem is uncountable. The set R led 
Skolem to the view that the concepts of set theory, 
e.g., 'set', 'subset of a set', '1-1 correspondence', 
'countable', etc., must be theory relative: a set 
which is uncountable in one axiomatization may be 
countable in another. (Stephen Kleene, Mathematical 
Logic (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), pp. 
323-24.) 
7Among the theoretical constraints for T would be 
those characteristics of a theory listed in note 4. T 
satisfies operational constraints if all sentences of T 
seem to be true in the appropriate circumstances: "T 
has the property of meeting all operational con-
straints. So, if 'there is a cow in front of me at 
such-and-such a time' belongs to T, then 'there is a 
cow in front of me at such-and-such a time' will cer-
tainly seem to be true" (RR, p. 126). 
*I am indebted to David Shwayder for this observa-
tion. 
'Alfred Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, 
translated by J. H. Woodger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1969), pp. 268-78. This particular observation was 
made on two separate occasions by Hugh Chandler and 
Steven Wagner. 
A somewhat similar line of argument is suggested by 
Robert Wengert, to wit: the metaphysical realist must 
employ the axiom of choice in order to prove the down-
ward Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, which is instrumental in 
Putnam's argument (it insures that operational con-
straints in a submodel are satisified). But, the axiom 
of choice provides a method by which the metaphysical 
realist may select an intended interpretation in a man-
ner which depends neither upon operational nor theoret-
ical constraints. Hence, if Putnam allows the realist 
to employ the axiom of choice, he is allowing that the 
realist may fix reference in a classical manner: just 
what he wanted to show that the realist couldn't do. 
, 0John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," 
Mind Design, edited by John Haugeland (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 1981), pp. 282-306. 
l l w I f we have more available with which to fix the 
intended model than merely theoretical and operational 
constraints, then the problem disappears." (MR, p. 
474). 
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"Richard Grandy, Advanced Logic for Applications 
(Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 128. 
Sentences such as Hugh Chandler's 'All properties are 
silly' suggest that a second-order formalization of 
natural language is in order. 
"See note 12. 
"Grandy, pp. 118-19. 
"Putnam makes an initial move to counter the 
charge that natural languages are second-order creat-
ures in "Models and Reality": "Some have proposed that 
second-order formalizations are the solution, at least 
for mathematics; but the 'intended' interpretation of 
the second-order formalism is not fixed by the use of 
the formalism (the formalism itself admits so-called 
'Henkin models', i.e., models in which the second-order 
variables fail to range over the full power set of the 
universe of individuals), and it becomes necessary to 
attribute to the mind special powers of 'grasping 
second-order notions'." (MR, p. 481). But, given the 
brevity of the comment and the immensity of the problem 
it is meant to solve, I am not sure just exactly what 
his countermove comes to. 
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